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Abstract 
In this manuscript we study individual variation in the 
interpretation of conditionals by establishing individual 
profiles of the participants based on their behavioral respon-
ses and reflective attitudes. To investigate the participants’ 
reflective attitudes we introduce a new experimental paradigm 
called the Scorekeeping Task, and a Bayesian mixture model 
tailored to analyze the data. The goal is thereby to identify the 
participants who follow the Suppositional Theory of condi-
tionals and Inferentialism and to investigate their performance 
on the uncertain and-to-if inference task.  
  
Keywords: conditionals; individual variation; and-to-if; 
norms; the Equation; inferentialism  
Introduction 
According to a popular theory in the psychology of reason-
ning (the Suppositional Theory, or ‘ST’), the probability of 
an indicative conditional (e.g. ‘If I forget to pay the rent, 
then my landlord will complaint’) is evaluated by a mental 
algorithm known as the Ramsey test (Evans & Over, 2004; 
Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Baratgin, Over, and Politzer, 
2013). 
THE RAMSEY TEST: to evaluate P(if A, then C) the 
participants add the antecedent to their background 
beliefs, make minimal adjustments to secure consistency, 
and evaluate the probability of the consequent on the basis 
of this temporarily augmented set of beliefs.  
Quantitatively, this introduces the following prediction, 
which is known as “the Equation”:  
PRED1: P(if A, then C) = P(C|A) 
Given that P(C|A) ≥ P(A,C) follows from the axioms of 
probability theory (an inequality referred to as probabilistic 
coherence; PCh), ST also predicts that: 
PRED2: P(if A, then C) ≥ P(A,C) 
Accordingly, the participants are predicted to conform to the 
following inequality in the so-called uncertain and-to-if 
inference (UAI), where they are presented with ‘A and C’ as 
a premise and ‘if A, then C’ as a conclusion and asked to 
assign probabilities to each: 
PRED2A: P(Conclusion) ≥ P(Premise) 
Cruz, Baratgin, Oaksford, and Over (2015) found that the 
participants conformed to PRED2A at above chance levels. 
This has been taken as indirect evidence in favor of ST. 
There is presently a considerable interest in and-to-if 
inferences, because recently a theory known as ‘inferentia-
lism’ made its appearance into the psychology of reasoning, 
which posits that indicate conditionals express inferential 
relations. In the truth-conditional version of inferentialism, 
it rejects the validity of the and-to-if inference ‘A∧C ⊨ if A, 
then C’ (Douven, 2015). Truth-conditional inferentialism 
rejects the validity of this argument scheme, because the 
indicative conditional is viewed as expressing a reason 
relation and the mere truth of A and C does not ensure that 
they are inferentially connected. Rejecting the validity of the 
and-to-inference is a distinguishing feature of this approach 
that separates it from other popular semantics of condi-
tionals like Stalnaker’s possible worlds semantics or the de 
Finetti truth table endorsed by proponents of ST.  
In Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer (2016a) a 
weaker probabilistic implementation of inferentialism was 
given in the form of the Default and Penalty Hypothesis 
(DP), which employs the following explication of the reason 
relation: 
PO: A is positively relevant for C (and a reason for C) iff 
P(C|A) > P(C|∼A)  
NE: A is negatively relevant for C (and a reason      
against C) iff P(C|A) < P(C|∼A) 
IR: A is irrelevant for C iff P(C|A) = P(C|∼A) 
DP posits that the participants have the goal of evaluating 
whether a sufficient reason relation obtains when evaluating 
P(if A, then C). According to Spohn’s (2012: ch. 6) 
explication of the reason relation given above, this requires 
at least two things: (a) assessing whether A is positively 
relevant for C, and (b) assessing the sufficiency of A as a 
reason for C by means of P(C|A). DP moreover postulates 
that the participants follow the heuristic, when processing 
natural language conditionals, of making the default 
assumption that (a) is satisfied, which reduces their task of 
assessing P(if A, then C) to assessing P(C|A). However, 
once the participants are negatively surprised by a violation 
of this default assumption, such as when they are presented 
with stimulus materials implementing the NE or IR 
category, they apply a penalty to P(if A, then C) to express 
the conditional’s failure to express that A is a reason for C. 
An example would be the conditional ‘If Oxford is in 
England, then Napoleon is dead’ which sounds defective to 
the extent that the antecedent is obviously irrelevant for the 
consequent. 
In support of DP, it was found in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. 
(2016a) that PRED1 only holds when A is positively 
relevant for C in virtue of raising its probability. When A is 
negatively relevant by lowering C’s probability, and when A 
is irrelevant for C by leaving its probability unchanged, 
violations of PRED1 occur. Consistent with these findings, it 
was found in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016b) that the above-
chance level of conformity to PRED2A reported in Cruz et 
al. (2015) only holds for PO. In NE and IR the participants 
are performing below chance levels. Further-more, this is a 
pattern that is not reflected in their conformity to the 
theorem P(C|A) ≥ P(A,C) across relevance levels, in spite of 
the fact the participants are supposed to conform to P(if A, 
then C) = P(C|A), according to ST. 
It is presently unclear whether this finding of lack of 
conformity to PRED2A in the NE and IR conditions indicates 
that the participants are making a reasoning error (by 
following ST) or whether they are not making a reasoning 
error but simply basing their performance on a different 
interpretation of conditionals (by following DP). The goal 
of the present study is to address this question. 
In the present experiment, we seek to establish individual 
profiles of the participants based on their behavioral 
responses and reflective attitudes. In order to study their 
reflective attitudes we implemented a novel experimental 
paradigm – the  Scorekeeping Task – suggested in 
Skovgaard-Olsen (2015), as well as a Bayesian mixture 
model tailored to classify the data coming from it (both are 
discussed in detail below). Based on this novel task and the 
associated data-analytic method, we were able to investigate 
two key questions: First, whether participants classified as 
ST accord with ST’s PRED2A prediction for the UAI across 
a relevance manipulation. Second, whether participants 
classified as DP accord with DP’s prediction that PRED2A 
only holds in the PO condition. In the IR condition, DP 
participants are expected to apply a penalty to conditionals 
in the conclusion of the UAI, such that P(if A, then C) < 
P(C|A) can occur, effectively dismissing PRED2A. 
Experiment 
Method 
Participants  
A total of 354 people from the USA, UK, Canada, and 
Australia completed the experiment, which was launched 
over the Internet (via Mechanical Turk) to obtain a large and 
demographically diverse sample. Participants were paid a 
small amount of money for their participation.   
The following exclusion criteria were used: not having 
English as native language (6 participants), completing the 
experiment in less than 300 seconds (2 participants), failing 
to answer two simple SAT comprehension questions 
correctly in a warm-up phase (89 participants), and answer-
ring ‘not serious at all’ to the question how serious they 
would take their participation at the beginning of the study 
(zero participants). Since some of these exclusion criteria 
were overlapping, the final sample consisted of 261 
participants. Mean age was 36.53 years, ranging from 20 to 
75, 66% were female, 66% indicated that the highest level 
of education that they had completed was an undergraduate 
degree or higher. 
 
Design  
The experiment implemented a within-subject design with 
two factors varied within participants: relevance (with two 
levels: PO, IR) and priors (with four levels: HH, HL, LH, 
LL, meaning, for example, that P(A) = low and P(C) = high 
for LH). 
 
Materials and Procedure 
We used a slightly modified version of 12 of the scenarios 
presented in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016b). For each 
scenario we had 8 conditions according to our design (i.e., 4 
conditions for PO [i.e., HH, HL, LH, LL], 4 conditions for 
IR). Each participant worked on one randomly selected 
(without replacement) scenario for each of the 8 within-
subjects conditions such that each participant saw a different 
scenario for each condition. Following the recommendations 
of Reips (2002), to reduce dropout rates, we presented two 
SAT comprehension questions as an initial high hurdle in a 
warm-up phase (in addition to using them for excluding 
participants). The experiment was split into four phases and 
on average took ca. 23 minutes to complete. Here we focus 
on conveying the underlying conceptual ideas.  
 
Phase 1, Behavioral Responses 
The first phase contained eight blocks, one for each within-
subjects condition. The order of the blocks was randomized 
anew for each participant and there were no breaks. Within 
each block, the participants were presented with four pages. 
On the first page, the participants were shown a scenario 
text like the following: 
Scott was just out playing with his friends in the snow. He 
has now gone inside but is still freezing and takes a bath. 
As both he and his clothes are very dirty, he is likely to 
make a mess in the process, which he knows his mother 
dislikes. 
The idea was to use brief scenario texts concerning basic 
causal, functional, or behavioral information that uniformly 
activates stereotypical assumptions about the relevance and 
prior probabilities of the antecedent and the consequent of 8 
conditionals that implement our experimental conditions for 
each scenario. So to introduce the 8 within-subjects condi-
tions for the scenario above we, inter alia, exploited the fact 
that the participants would assume that Scott’s turning on 
the warm water would raise the probability of Scott being 
warm soon (PO) and that Scott’s friends being roughly the 
same age as Scott would be irrelevant for whether Scott will 
turn on the warm water (IR).  
This scenario text was repeated on each of the following 
three pages, which measured P(A and C), P(C|A), and P(if 
A, then C) in random order. Throughout the experiment, the 
participants gave their probability assignments using sliders 
with values between 0 and 100%. To measure P(C|A), the 
participants might thus be presented with the following 
question in an IR condition: 
Suppose Scott’s friends are roughly the same age as Scott. 
Under this assumption, how probable is it that the 
following sentence is true on a scale from 0 to 100%: 
Scott will turn on the warm water. 
 
Phase 2, the Scorekeeping Task 
In this phase the participants were first presented with a new 
IRHH item to be rated in the same way as the items in phase 
one. Then the participants were presented with the following 
instruction:  
When given the task you just completed, John and Robert 
responded very differently to some of the scenarios as 
outlined below.   
And it was explained that John and Robert responded in the 
following way to the “if-then sentence” and the “suppose-
sentence” (where the “suppose-sentence” had been identi-
fied for the participants as the type of question quoted above 
for measuring P(C|A)):  
John assigned 99% to the suppose-sentence and 1% to the 
if_then sentence.  
Robert assigned 90% to the suppose-sentence and 90% to 
the if_then sentence. 
Note that although John and Robert are fictive participants, 
these values were based on actual data provided by other 
participants in response to the IRHH item in previous 
experiments. In order to reduce the processing demands, 
these values were repeated on each of the following four 
pages along with the IRHH item, which John and Robert 
allegedly had responded to. The conditional took the 
following form, and it was evaluated in the context of a 
dating scenario describing Stephen’s preparations for a date 
with Sara: ‘If Stephen’s neighbour prefers to put milk on his 
cornflakes, then Stephen will wear some of his best clothes 
on the date’.  
As part of the scorekeeping task, the participants were 
instructed to apply a sanction to John or Robert’s response 
based on its adequacy. Given their large divergence, the 
participants were instructed that at most one of John or 
Robert’s responses could be approved as adequate. 
Since the experiment was run on Mechanical Turk we 
exploited the fact that an ecologically valid sanction for the 
participants would be not to have a task (a “HIT”) approved. 
Since the approval of HITs on Mechanical Turk determines 
whether the participants are paid for a completed task (and 
moreover counts towards their reputation on Mechanical 
Turk, which determines whether they can participate in 
future HITs) it is our experience that the participants care a 
lot about the approval of their HITs. We therefore expected 
that applying the sanction of not approving either John or 
Robert’s HIT based on its adequacy would be a contextually 
salient sanction, which the participants would be highly 
motivated to reason with. 
Next the participants were asked to state the reasons that 
they could think of which could be given for or against John 
and Robert’s responses in an open entry question, which 
was included in the experiment for exploratory purposes.  
On the two pages that followed, the participants were 
presented with John’s criticism of Robert and Robert’s 
criticism of John in random order. Robert made the 
following complaint about John’s response: 
Robert's no difference justification: “There is no        
difference between the two questions. So why do you give 
a lower probability to:  
'IF Stephen’s neighbour prefers to put milk on his 
cornflakes, THEN Stephen will wear some of his best 
clothes on the date’  
than you gave to: 'Stephen will wear some of his best 
clothes on the date' under the assumption that 'Stephen’s 
neighbour prefers to put milk on his cornflakes'?  
This makes no sense!” 
John in turn made the following complaint about Robert’s 
response:  
John's irrelevance justification: “Whether 'Stephen’s 
neighbour prefers to put milk on his cornflakes' or not is 
irrelevant for whether 'Stephen will wear some of his best 
clothes on the date'.  
So why do you give such a high probability to: ‘IF 
Stephen’s neighbour prefers to put milk on his cornflakes, 
THEN Stephen will wear some of his best clothes on the 
date'? This makes no sense!” 
In each case, the participants were asked to indicate (yes/no) 
whether they agreed with the following statements: 
John’s irrelevance justification [/Robert’s no difference 
justification] shows that Robert's [/John’s] response is 
wrong. 
Robert [/John] needs to come up with a very good 
response to John's [/Robert’s] criticism, if his HIT is to be 
approved. 
Finally, after having seen the justifications from both sides, 
the participants were asked which justification they found 
most convincing by choosing between the following 
options, presented in random order:  
The two justifications are equally convincing 
John’s irrelevance justification 
Robert’s no difference justification 
The participants then had to indicate who’s HIT deserved to 
be approved based on their justifications by selecting one of 
the options below, presented in random order: 
None of their HITs should be approved 
Robert’s HIT should be approved 
John’s HIT should be approved 
 
Phase 3, the Uncertain And-to-If Inference 
This phase tested the participants’ performance on the UAI 
under relevance manipulations. Phase 3 was used to 
measure whether the participants displayed a consistent 
behavior on the UAI with the interpretation of the 
conditional that they had been classified according based on 
their responses in phase 1 and phase 2. 
Phase 3 contained 8 blocks implementing the same within-
subjects conditions as phase 1. For each participant, the 
same permutations of scenarios and within-subject condi-
tions that had been randomly generated in phase 1 was disp-
layed again in random order. First the participants were 
instructed that they would be presented with a scenario text 
as earlier and a short argument based on the scenario text. 
They were told that the premise and the conclusion of this 
argument could be uncertain and that it was their task to 
evaluate the probabilities of the premise and conclusion. 
Each block contained one page. On the top of the page the 
scenario text was placed as a reminder. Below the 
participants were instructed to read an argument containing 
the conjunction as a premise and the conditional as a 
conclusion, employing sentences that they assigned 
probabilities to in phase 1. Furthermore, the actual value of 
the probability that they had assigned to the premise in 
phase 1 was displayed to the participants in a salient blue 
color. We here illustrate it using the example from above 
from phase 1 of a POHH item: 
Premise: Scott’s turns on the warm water AND Scott will 
be warm soon. 
Conclusion: IF Scott’s turns on the warm water, THEN 
Scott will be warm soon. 
You have estimated the probability of the premise as: 
90%. Please rate the probability of the statement in the 
conclusion on a scale from 0 to 100%.  
In Phase 4, we tested the participants’ interpretation of the 
probabilities (Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999). These results 
are beyond the scope of the present manuscript and 
therefore not reported here. 
Bayesian Mixture Modeling 
In order to investigate the participants’ interpretation of the 
conditional, the probability judgments they produced in 
Phase 1 were classified as coming from one of two latent 
classes using an indicator variable w. This classification was 
achieved by means of a Bayesian Mixture model (for a 
similar approach, see Lee, 2016). In the PO condition, 
where both ST and DP make the same predictions (see the 
left panel of Figure 1), the mixture model assumed that 
responses from an individual i were generated by ST/DP 
(  
    ), or by an unclassifiable response-generation 
mechanism (  
    ), for an item-pair j: 
                    
 
   
            
     
                      
     
  
where 0       ≤ 100. 
When an individual follows ST/DP, the generated P(if A, 
then C) are expected to follow P(C|A) along with some 
truncated Gaussian noise term εi,j with mean 0 and variance 
σ² (see the left panel of Figure 1). This noise captures the 
variability that is commonly observed in probability 
judgments across the [0%, 100%] interval (see Costello & 
Watts, 2016).  When an individual follows an unclassified 
pattern, their responses were captured by a saturated model, 
which established a β parameter per data point (predicting 
the latter perfectly).
1
  
In the IR condition, the model only considered 
participants that were classified as ST/DP in the PO 
condition (i.e., the PO condition served as a filter for the IR 
condition). Here, both ST (  
    ) and DP (  
    ) 
make distinct predictions: 
                    
                      
     
                        
     
  
with 0 ≤ θi ≤ 1. 
When individuals follow ST, the generated P(if A, then 
C) are again expected to follow P(C|A). In contrast, when 
individuals follow DP, P(if A, then C) follows a penalized 
version of P(C|A) (with the penalty being determined by θ). 
Note that when θ=1, the ST and DP models coincide, 
although the implied predictions are not really in accordance 
with the gist of DP. However, this point turns out not to be 
of practical import, because since ST is more parsimonious 
it will be preferred when θ=1 (see Lee, 2016).   
 
 
Figure 1. Predictions from both theoretical accounts 
(including some moderate degree of truncated noise). 
                                                          
1 To make the saturated model identifiable, we constrained σ² to 
be the same for both latent classes. 
 The key parameters of interest in this analysis are the 
posterior probabilities of wi =1 obtained in the PO and IR 
conditions. In the PO condition, when the mean of this 
posterior probability was estimated to be below or equal to 
.50, the individual was classified as following the saturated 
model. When the mean is estimated to be larger than .50, the 
individual was classified as following ST/DP. In the IR 
condition, these same ranges of values led to the ST and DP 
classifications, respectively.  
The individual classifications jointly obtained for PO and 
IR were used to characterize the conformity of individuals’ 
responses to theoretically-meaningful inequalities, namely 
UAI and PCh. For participant i, the probability that her 
response to a given item-pair j conformed to a given 
inequality is given by Φ(Δi + Ki,j), with Φ() being the 
probability function of the standard Normal distribution. 
Parameter Ki,j is a correction term for participant i and item-
pair j such that Φ(Ki,j) corresponds to the probability that the 
responses to a given item-pair were inequality-conforming 
by chance alone (Singmann, Klauer, & Over, 2014). 
Parameter Δi corresponds to that individual’s displacement 
from chance (i.e., when Δi is positive, that individual 
produces inequality-conforming responses at an above-
chance rate). Using a hierarchical framework, these 
individual parameters were assumed to come from a Normal 
group-level distribution, with mean µΔ and standard 
deviation σΔ. If individuals in general conform to the UAI or 
PCh, then their respective µΔ should be consistently above 0 
(i.e., the probability of µΔ being below 0 should be very 
small). These parameters were estimated separately for 
individuals classified as ST and DP in the IR condition. 
A very similar hierarchical approach was used to model 
the relative probability of an individual judging the no-
difference justification (in line with ST) as most convincing 
after having seen both sides, as well as the relative 
probability attributing the HIT to such justification. 
Results 
The posterior-parameter distributions of mixture model 
were estimated via Gibbs sampling using the general-
purpose software JAGS (Plummer, 2003). Chain 
convergence was confirmed via the R-hat statistic and visual 
inspection. The individual-level classifications shown in 
Figure 2 show that the probabilities generated by the 
majority (225 out of 261) of individuals in the PO condition 
were in line with ST/DP. In contrast, only a very small 
group of individuals were in line with ST in the IR 
condition (39 out of 225); most followed the predictions of 
DP. The individual data shown in Figure 1 shows that the 
data classified as ST/DP in the PO condition as well as ST 
and DP in the IR condition were in line with the model 
predictions. To address the worry that participants 
belonging to ST were misclassified as DP, we visually 
inspected the responses of every participant individually. 
The classifications lead to clear differences in both UAI 
and PCh, as well as in the probability of judging the no-
difference justification as most convincing. As shown in 
Table 1, for UAI the posterior µΔ estimates in the IR 
condition for individuals classified as ST are systematically 
above 0, but systematically below 0 for individuals 
classified as DP. In the case of PCh, the posterior µΔ 
estimates were systematically above 0, as expected. The 
latter result was less clear for ST, but this is expected given 
the small number of participants classified as being in line 
with ST. 
Finally, the relative probabilities of judging the no-
difference justification (consistent with ST) as most 
convincing and attributing the HIT were drastically different 
for individuals classified as following ST and DP. These 
posterior probabilities were considerably larger for ST (see 
Table 1). Note that these were conditional probabilities of 
finding the ST justification most convincing, and accepting 
the ST HIT, given the participants expressed preferences for 
either ST or DP in phase 2.  
Figure 2. Individual associated to the different Phase 1 classifications, and their 
respective posterior individual-level classifications (note that in the IR condition, 
only participants classified as ST/DP in the PO condition were considered). 
 ST Followers (N=39) DP Followers (N=186) 
       
 UAI  0.61 [0.16, 1.11]  (72%) -0.46 [-0.65 -0.28] (47%) 
 PCh  0.21 [-0.07, 0.51] (68%)  0.14 [ 0.02,  0.27] (66%) 
 P(ST mc) 
 P(ST HIT) 
.94 [.78, 1] 
.92[.77, 1] 
         .15 [.09, .22] 
.21 [.15, .28] 
 
Table 1. Median group-level posterior parameter estimates (and 
their respective 95% credibility intervals) obtained in the IR 
condition. Percentages of responses conforming to UAI and PCh 
are given in parentheses. The estimates associated to    in the PO 
condition (where participants were classified as ST/DP) were 1.66 
[1.14, 2.24] and 1.19 [0.82, 1.61] for UAI and PCh, respectively. 
‘P(ST mc)’ = P(ST most convincing | ST or DP most convincing). 
‘P(ST HIT)’ = P(ST receive HIT | ST or DP receive HIT). 
Discussion 
In this paper we have presented a novel experimental design 
to study the reflective attitudes of the participants and an 
accompanying Bayesian mixture model to study individual 
variation. We have seen that it is possible to classify the 
participants according to whether they follow the 
Suppositional Theory of Conditionals or the Default and 
Penalty Hypothesis. We then used these classifications to 
study the participants’ performance on the uncertain and-to-
if inference task to examine whether the participants 
consistently followed the assigned interpretation of the 
conditional in an inference task.    
This experimental design gives us a very rich data set that 
we have not exhausted in this brief note. Nevertheless, the 
data we did analyze show a very clear pattern. In the PO 
condition of phase 1, 86% of the participants followed the 
Equation (PRED1), whereas only 39 of these participants 
followed the Equation in the IR condition. The remaining 
186 participants showed a clear tendency in the IR condition 
to assign lower probabilities than if they had treated the P(if 
A, then C) as a conditional probability. For the 39 ST 
participants from phase 1 there was a .94 probability that 
they find the ST character to be most convincing one, 
conditional on the fact that they had a preference. Of the 
186 DP participants in phase 1, this conditional probability 
was .85, this time in favor of the DP character.    
Finally, the participants’ performance on the uncertain 
and-to-if inference task in phase 3 indicated that the 
participants acted consistently with their assigned 
interpretation of the conditional. As a theorem of probability 
theory, the PCh inequality (P(C|A) ≥ P(A,C)) remains valid 
for both groups, so they should conform to it at above 
chance levels irrespectively of the relevance condition. In 
contrast, whether the participants should conform to the 
UAI inequality (P(Conclusion) ≥ P(Premise)) in the IR 
condition, depends on whether they interpret the conditional 
in the conclusion as a conditional probability.  
In the PO condition both groups were above chance levels 
for conformity to both the UAI and PCh inequalities. For 
the ST participants, a tendency was found to continue to 
conform to the UAI and PCh inequalities in the IR condition 
at above chance levels. (However, the estimates were 
connected with uncertainty given the modest size of the ST 
group.) In contrast, for the DP participants an interaction 
was revealed between relevance and type of inequality in 
that these participants continued to display conformity to 
PCh at above chance levels in the IR condition while 
ceasing to conform to the UAI inequality at above chance 
levels. The results thus indicate that it was possible to 
separate two individual profiles in the participants’ 
interpretation of the conditional. For each profile, the 
participants were shown to behave consistently with their 
interpretation of the conditional in the uncertain and-to-if 
inference.  
In Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016b), it was found that the 
above-chance level conformity to UAI, which Cruz et al. 
(2015) did not generalize to the IR condition. However, 
since these results were analyzed at the group level, it was 
hard to tell whether they indicated that the participants were 
incoherent or whether they followed DP instead. With the 
present results we have a first indicator that two groups can 
be identified at the individual level that consistently follow 
their assigned interpretation of the conditional in the 
uncertain and-to-if inference. 
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